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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROPOSITION 8
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*

Is Proposition 81 unconstitutional? This straightforward
question is a very difficult topic to address, particularly because the entire litigation is ill-conceived, and because I am a
fairly ardent libertarian with respect to matters of personal behavior. This Essay will argue that there is a political case for
gay marriage, but in the end, it concludes that the political case
does not rise to the level of a constitutional case. That conclusion holds true whether this question is conceived broadlythe approach the debate between Professor William Eskridge
and myself originally took2 or whether it is conceived more
narrowly, in connection with the particular circumstances of
Proposition 8 and the history that preceded it.
The single most salutary proposition that guides a libertarian
thinker is this: An individual who is deeply offended by the
personal conduct of other people has no warrant to alter or
change their conduct unless and until the conduct involves the
use of force and fraud against the individual. 3 Interference with
intimate, personal behaviors requires a powerful social warrant. It is very difficult to bring these personal behaviors within
the Millian principle that proscribes harm to others, 4 at least if
harm is defined to exclude personal offense. So, for a libertarian, the difficulty with issues surrounding gay marriage de* Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University Law School; Peter
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School. This Essay is an adaptation of remarks delivered
during the Third Annual Rosenkranz Debate at the 2010 Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention, Nov. 20, 2010, in Washington, D.C.
1. CAL CONST. art. I, § 7.5 ("Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid
or recognized in California.").
2. See Richard A. Epstein & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Annual Rosenkranz Debate
at the 2010 Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention, A Debate on the
Constitutionality of Proposition 8 (Nov. 20, 2010).
3. See generally John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 14
(John Gray ed., Oxford University Press 1991) (1859).
4. See id.
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rives not from the institution of marriage as such, but rather
from the state requirement of marriage licenses.
The insistent question is this: If marriage is some kind of
natural associational freedom, why may the state horn in to
decide that a particular person can or cannot get a marriage
license? It is possible to justify this state intervention on the
grounds that some people are too young or too feeble to marry.
Yet clearly these standard protective measures are not what is
at stake in this debate.
As a matter of first principle, the system of state marriage licenses should be examined through the lens of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.9 If the state is going to give licenses to one group of people to engage in a certain transaction, then it must have strong reasons for denying licenses to
any other group of people seeking the same privilege. This approach, under straight political theory, would mean that a limited state could not pick and choose its friends. Once various
activists and religious groups recognize that marriage licenses
have been taken out of politics, then they have nothing to gain
from agitation. Their best response, therefore, is to insist on
maintaining the integrity of their own institutions, while becoming profoundly indifferent to the behaviors of other people
and their choice of whom to marry.
The great virtue would be this: If by taking offense one does
not get any moral claim over other people's virtues, then agitation and distress only hurts one's self, without generating any
collateral political advantage. At this point society gains the
ideal position as a matter of political economy-that situation,
to paraphrase David Hume, where carelessness and inattention
to the foibles of other people become the dominant strategy for
all individuals who wish to make their way in the world.6 People would not have to show mutual respect for the behaviors of
others, but they would be required, at the very least, to tolerate
those behaviors. Once toleration is the required norm, perhaps
by degrees and over time, some mutual cordiality could develop as well, as different groups seek to forge some common
5. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987 Term-Foreward: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5
(1988).
6. Cf DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 127 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
Oxford University Press 1975) (1739).
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ground on issues of mutual concern. The libertarian's hope is
that people will come to see the wisdom of a legal regime that
denies all interest groups the ability to control the political
process based on a deep-seated conviction of the moral superiority of their own views. Notwithstanding the ups and downs
on the issue of gay marriage, the level of mutual toleration
seems to have increased in the United States, so that those opposed to gay marriage are now more willing to adopt a live-andlet-live approach to one of the most divisive issues of our time.
One sign of this progress is that the present debate is not
about whether the legal system should afford protection to gay
couples. 7 Contemporary dialogue is far removed from the debate in the 1960s about whether the state should remove gay
and lesbian conduct from the list of criminal offenses recognized by various psychiatric groups.8 Most opponents of gay
marriage concede that civil unions grant gay parties all of the
rights and disabilities of marriage, and the dominant issue is
instead the (highly important) symbolic question of whether
the state should attach the label of "marriage" to civil unions. 9
The bottom line is that we have gone very far already, but it
turns out that the last five percent of this long journey is still
capable of causing much grief.
How, then, should we think about the difficulties in California? The ideal approach may be to wait five years, hold another
referendum, and turn the popular sentiment so that it is at least
fifty-four to forty-six in the other direction, a very realistic shift
in public opinion. That gradualist approach puts the constitutional debate to one side and lowers the political temperature.
The supporters of gay marriage who win on this issue would
then have political legitimacy squarely on their side. Although

7. California law allows same-sex couples to enter into domestic partnerships,
giving these couples the same set of financial and personal benefits as heterosexual couples. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299 (West 2011).
8. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that states have no legitimate interest in proscribing private, consensual homosexual conduct. 539 U.S. 558, 578
(2003).
9. Judge Walker's decision invalidating Proposition 8 emphasized that same-sex
domestic partnerships did not carry "the cultural meaning of marriage and its
associated benefits." Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 971 (N.D. Cal.
2010).
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I am generally uneasy with referenda, 10 in the case of California
it may be best to resolve the entire matter within the framework of existing institutions.
Next this Essay will address Proposition 8 in terms of constitutional law. First of all, note that the location of the Equal Protection Clause is after the Privileges or Immunities Clause and
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 As a
matter of historical construction, the phrase "privileges or immunities" was intended to address the substantive rights that
received explicit protection. 12 If the right to a same-sex marriage were located in the Constitution, then it would be found
in the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The American Constitution reflected the dominant attitude of its time, when a people
who were relatively laissez-faire with respect to a variety of
economic issues were also completely dogmatic about norms
relating to sexuality, gambling, and other sorts of potentially
sinful behavior. 13 But finding constitutional protection for
same-sex marriage jars with the uniform historical practice of
the time, which widely and unwisely treated homosexual conduct as criminal,14 subjecting it to regulation under the socalled morals head of the police power.1 5 If you raise the ques10. See Richard A. Epstein, Direct Democracy: Government of the People, by the People, andfor the People?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 819 (2011).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1.
12. See Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition,
1997 UTAH L. REv. 665, 692 ("If there is any textually and historically plausible
authorization for the protection of unenumerated rights, it is to be found in [the
Privileges or Immunities] Clause...."); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130
S. Ct. 3020, 3059 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).
13. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1986) ("Sodomy was a
criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original
thirteen States when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, all but five of the thirty-seven States in the Union had
criminal sodomy laws.").
14. Id.
15. For those familiar with legal history on the subject, there is a quartet of powers reserved to the States as part of their inherent sovereign powers. These are
grouped together under the rubric of police powers. First and second are health
and safety, which most people understand. Then there is general welfare, which is
a bit amorphous, but is best understood as applying to the provisions of standard
nonexcludable public goods. The last aspect of the state's police powers deals
with morals. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 541 (2005) (noting that a state action survives substantive due process review if it falls within the
state's police power, having a "substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare"); see Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et al., Survey on the Constitu-
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tion of same-sex marriage today, one can creatively re-imagine
the way in which earlier Justices might have thought about
same-sex marriage, but historically, until the past generation,
nothing was further from their thoughts. For example, in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, when Justice James McReynolds referred to
16
the rights of parents to guide the education of their children,
it is highly unlikely that he meant to include parents that are
same-sex couples. In light of these historical realities, one certainly cannot make the constitutional case for same-sex marriages through the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
But if the Privileges or Immunities Clause does not cover the
issue, why propose that the gap is made up through the Equal
Protection Clause? The Equal Protection Clause emphasized
the word17 "protection" as much as it emphasized the word
"equal." These were rights given to all persons, a broader
class than citizens. 8 It was also the case that the rights granted
to all persons were both fewer and more basic than those given
to citizens. For example, Privileges or Immunities protected
economic liberties, while Due Process (also extended to all persons) only protected against seizure.1 9 Privileges or Immunities
gave only citizens the right to acquire property, but Due Process protected the property of all persons against expropriation.
The primary purpose associated with the Equal Protection
Clause was not to deal with class or caste legislation, which
would have been covered by Privileges or Immunities if covered
by any part of the Fourteenth Amendment at all. Instead, the
Equal Protection Clause had the great and noble purpose of addressing an ongoing evil: the perverted enforcement of the
criminal law. At the time of its passage, it was not uncommon for
the criminal justice system to hand down harsh penalties to black
defendants, while letting white defendants go with a slap on the
tional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521,
553 (1986).
16. 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
17. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
18. The Equal Protection Clause states that "nor [shall any State] deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 (emphases added). The Privileges or Immunities Clause states that "[n]o
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Id.

19. See Richard A. Epstein, Further Thoughts on the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the FourteenthAmendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1096, 1096-97 (2005).
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wrist.2° Conversely, there were situations where, if the victim
were a black person, the prosecutor would be indifferent towards
bringing the guilty party to justice, whereas for a white victim the
prosecutor would zealously seek out a defendant. 21 Such travesties of justice were particularly egregious in the aftermath of the
withdrawal of Northern troops from the South, as exemplified by
United States v. Cruikshank.22 Once the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is recognized, there is a powerful reason for wanting
the clause to remain separate and distinct from issues of gay marriage, or indeed any class or caste legislation.
Cruikshank rests on The Slaughterhouse Cases, 23 the most disappointing opinion in the history of Western civilization in
some senses, because the Court abandoned all efforts to identify the substantive commitments of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. But the aspirations to protect economic liberties
resurfaced within a decade, through the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses. 24 A number of statutes that could be
termed class-and-caste legislation then became vulnerable to
constitutional challenge. In class legislation, the modern Equal
Protection jurisprudence becomes highly selective: Those individuals that can only earn two dollars an hour-when the
minimum wage is three dollars an hour-may be singled out.
The focus on economic liberty was used to attack this sort of
class legislation, and in the Lochner era, circa 1905, these statutes were attacked on both liberty of contract and equal protection grounds. 2- The effort to increase protections for economic

20. See John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal
Protection of the Laws," 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421, 445 (1972).
21. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 56-59 (1955) (noting that the Thirty-ninth Congress understood equal protection to mean "the literal sense of benefiting equally from
laws for the security of person and property").
22.92 U.S. 542 (1875).
23.83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
24. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623 (1887).
25. See, e.g., Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897) (invalidating
on equal protection grounds a regulation that obligated railroad defendants to
pay attorney's fees of successful plaintiffs); In re Aubry, 78 P. 900 (Wash. 1904)
(invalidating on equal protection grounds a regulation requiring registration of
horseshoers).
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liberties is a noble endeavor, 26 and it would be a favorable exchange to yield the ground on Proposition 8 in return for a systematic and thoroughgoing explanation of how these challenges
could simply annihilate ninety-nine percent of the current social
democratic welfare state.
But in the nineteenth century there was a well-documented,
completely dysfunctional attitude toward some of the key
questions surrounding gay marriage. Legislation that denigrated homosexuals was often justified under the ability of the
state to protect the morals of its citizenry through the state's
police power.27 There is no question that this attitude dominated
for a very long period of time, until it was eventually reversed in
Lawrence v. Texas in 2003.28 Before Lawrence, the switch was that
restrictions on activities that traditionally fell within the morals
head of the police power now were treated as per se constitutional no matter how irrational, no matter how crazy, or how
foolish. As a matter of normative political theory, this was not
the high point of American constitutional jurisprudence.
The real question is why this structure lasted as long as it
did. It turns out that claims for gay marriage give rise to a very
complicated duet between the rational and normative approaches. Some argue that California is a special case because
the state has been unable to fulfill any of the purported justifications for banning gay marriage. 29 Admittedly, it is not likely,
for example, that anyone could successfully defend the ban on
gay marriage as a way to protect children.30 But the historical
approach represents a different view on psychology. There is a
wonderful article by Professor Jonathan Haidt about the Emotional Dog and the Rational Tail. 31 His main point is that moral

26. See Richard A. Epstein, The Classical Liberal Alternative to Progressiveand Con-

servative Constitutionalism,77 U. CHI. L. REV. 887 (2010).
27. See, e.g., Christensen v. State, 468 S.E.2d 188, 190 (Ga. 1996).
28. 539 U.S. 558, 571-74 (2003) (finding an "emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex").
29. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 930, 934-46 (N.D. Cal.
2010); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401-02 (Cal. 2008).
30. See, e.g., Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (finding that "the laws of California
recognize no relationship between a person's sexual orientation and his or her
ability to raise children").
31. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist
Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001).
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judgments are hardwired into all human beings everywhere. 32
Individuals take these judgments and then articulate a social
rationalization to support them. 33 Historically, this description
seems to be quite accurate as it pertains to matters of sexual
behavior, reproduction, and similar family matters. Our moral
intuitions are deeply held and highly authoritarian, so people
in civilized society are constantly trying to figure out a way to
rein in their own worst impulses while understanding the rational arguments on the other side. The conflict between tradition and rationality is most acute in this context.
The last thing wise people want to do to a population that is
struggling with a hard issue, but making some degree of moral
progress, is to dismiss the population's deepest beliefs as completely irrational. Voters in Iowa voted according to their instincts when they removed the judges who supported gay
marriage. 34 Even though wiser minds might have persuaded
them to review the issue from scratch, the voters resented the
attempt to sweep aside their traditional, deeply held values.
Judge Walker was inappropriately dismissive of these strongly
held popular views under the highly permissive rational basis
test. 35 When first announced in Justice Holmes' dissent in
Lochner v. New York, 36 rational basis review was intended to insulate modern legislative initiatives, such as maximum-hours
laws, from being attacked as impermissible deviations from
traditional common law principles. There was never a thought
that the test could be turned against statutes that embodied
traditional understandings. 37 On this question at least, the invalidation of Proposition 8 represents a genuine judicial revolution, and an unnecessary one as well. There is no need to
fight the moral battle on gay marriage once it is legalized. Accordingly, it is not appropriate to tell people who have to re32. Id. at 817.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at Al.
35. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1002-03 ("[Proposition 8's p]roponents' purported
rationales are nothing more than post-hoc justifications .... Moral disapproval
alone is an improper basis on which to deny rights to gay men and lesbians.").
36. 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 76 (arguing that only statutes infringing "fundamental principles as
they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law" should
be overturned).
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lease their legal control over marriage that they cannot use
their own moral views to justify their conduct and that of their
coreligionists. It is therefore regrettable that so much misplaced
erudition has been used to support false historical propositions. Thus I think that learned feminist historians, such as Professor Nancy Cott, are incorrect when they tell us that
38
household stability, not gender, lies at the core of marriage.
Professor Cott is only correct to the extent that she believes that
gender is not at the core of marriage; sex is, which is why the
marriage vow speaks of "forsaking all others." 39 Professor
Cott's extravagant claims falsify tradition, falsify history, and
falsify any sound understanding of the past. It makes me very
leery of using any form of expert witnesses in legal trials on
subjects that are as sensitive as this one.
The final issue to consider is the agenda behind these constitutional innovations. A libertarian, based on his moral judgments, could make an argument sounding in freedom of
association for why gay marriage should be allowed. But such
a rationale tends to go much further than endorsing gay marriage only, and often extends to other types of marriages as
well. For example, there is no argument that can be made
against polygamy that does not apply even more strongly to
gay marriage. After all, polygamy has a long history of acceptance in some groups, whereas gay marriage is of a far newer
vintage. A libertarian who defends freedom of association may
wish to see the polygamy ban lifted as well.
If the distinctions between types of marriages are regarded as
completely irrational byproducts of personal moral judgments,
then the same attitude will support an anti-discrimination law to
protect gays against these irrational prejudices. My fear here is
that the case for gay marriage now rests on its moral superiority, which in turn rests on whether it is possible to allow people
to discriminate in their own personal associations if their preferences are so ill-formed. Should, for example, the Catholic
Church be allowed to cling to what others regard as antiquated
stereotypes when they refuse to ordain women as priests?
38. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 933 (endorsing Professor Cott's conclusion that stability is "[t]he state's primary purpose").
39. See, e.g., THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER ACCORDING TO THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE SACRAMENTS AND OTHER RITES AND CEREMONIES OF THE
ACCORDING TO THE USE OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH 433-34 (1985).
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Given the logic behind gay marriage, the state should surely
have the right to override any claims of freedom of association
and might be constitutionally obliged to do so. The new tradition is troublesome because, in times of wide social disagreement, it lacks tolerance when tolerance is needed most.
The problem with Judge Walker's approach is that it makes
us so dependent on his epistemic findings about a potential
parade of horrible occurrences, on constitutional grounds.
Thankfully, he does not take that aggressive line, but he does
something that is, in some sense, worse: He shifts the scope of
the debate from whether gay marriage is guaranteed against
the state under the Fourteenth Amendment to the validity of a
proposition that says that if a right was once legalized but then
taken away by referendum, then the right has become federally
guaranteed under the Constitution (so long as parents have a
right to withdraw their students from those classes that teach
about gay marriage). That argument is too convoluted for its
own good, and furthermore, it is a bad idea to craft an argument in favor of gay marriage that works only under the peculiar and twisted history of California.
The crux of the issue of gay marriage is whether it is a classification that should be tolerated. Half-measures are a sign of
intellectual weakness in this case. I would actually respect the
constitutional argument against Proposition 8 more if it frankly
stated that serious scholars and lawyers do not care about this
tangled history.
For all people at all times, it is unclear what path proper
analysis should follow. There is a real conflict in constitutional
law between that which is based on rationality and that which
is based on tradition and psychology. If rationality arguments
are relied upon too much, then the world is going to push back.
We are all imperfect human beings. We can and should make
an immense advance in this particular area, but the only way
we are going to be able to do it is to pull the reins back a little
bit and let the horse go at a slower pace. Whip the horse forward and you may collapse the entire carriage.
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